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Do representational pictures have propositional contents? The current paper argues that the 
characteristic contents of pictures are predicative rather than propositional: pictures 
characterise things as looking certain ways, and they thereby express properties of visual 
perspectives. The paper argues that the characteristic predicative contents of pictures are 
nonetheless able to feature in fully-fledged propositional contents once they are combined 
with contents of other suitable sorts. Various facts about communicative uses of pictures are 
then explained. The paper concludes by considering the bearing of its conclusions upon 





We are able to understand many kinds of representations. Given that our ability to understand 
representations derives from our ability to grasp their contents, it is natural to wonder about 
the relationships that hold among the contents of the various sorts of representations that we 
are able to understand. 
 Pictures have often been contrasted with sentences. The role that vision plays in our 
comprehension of, say, a picture of a cat on a mat seems to be very different to the role that it 
plays in our understanding of an inscription of the sentence “a cat sat on a mat”. But it is 
natural to think that the contrast goes deeper than that. For the very nature of the information 
that we get from pictures often seems to be especially visual, in a way that contrasts with the 
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nature of the information that we typically get from sentences. Our understandings of pictures 
commonly interact with our visual recognitional capacities, for instance, in ways that our 
understandings of words generally do not. 
 The notion of a proposition has its roots in philosophical reflection upon language, 
and that aspect of its genesis is still apparent today.1 Thus, in a recent book exploring various 
approaches to propositions, the very first remark that is made in response to the question why 
many philosophers believe in propositions is that, “in the first instance, sentences of natural 
languages (taken relative to contexts of utterance) seem to encode pieces of information”2, 
where it is suggested that those pieces of information may be identified with propositions.  
 Given that the contents of pictures seem often to be rather different to the contents of 
ordinary sentences, though, and given that the notion of a proposition has its natural home in 
thought about language, the question whether the contents of pictures are propositional is an 
obvious one to ask.   
 The current paper addresses that question. The next section briefly examines the idea 
of a proposition, outlining the functional approach to propositions that has dominated recent 
debate. Section 3 then presents some considerations that might be felt to support the claim 
that pictures have propositional contents; some counterarguments owed to Crane are 
discussed and briefly criticised, although the paper eventually endorses one of Crane’s main 
contentions. Section 4 makes a general suggestion about a particularly elementary form of 
content that many pictures are used to express, one which is also crucial to a wide array of 
additional communicative uses of pictures. 
Section 5 sharpens up that suggestion, by providing an account of a fundamental 
variety of pictorial content. Section 6 uses the resulting ideas to formulate a general position 
on the relationships holding between propositions and the contents expressed by appropriate 
communicative uses of pictures, and to explain certain phenomena. Section 7 concludes, with 
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some further reflections upon the relationships holding between pictorial contents, 




What are propositions? It is widely held that the idea of, say, the proposition that snow is 
white serves to gather together certain related roles that a single item should be called upon to 
perform.3 The proposition that snow is white is then whatever fits the bill. The notion of a 
proposition is thus naturally treated as being a functional one: the class of propositions 
encompasses those items that perform certain tasks, just as the class of headteachers covers 
those people who fulfill certain roles in the lives of schools.4 But what are the parts that 
propositions must play? 
Philosophers have put propositions to many uses, and there is room for debate over 
just which of those roles best serve to define what it is to be a proposition. King claims, for 
instance, that “propositions are the meanings of sentences taken relative to contexts and what 
is grasped in understanding a sentence in a context”5. Yet how exactly is that claim to be 
construed? Is it being claimed that every proposition is the meaning of a sentence taken 
relative to a possible context? Or—much less strongly—that some propositions are the 
meanings of sentences taken relative to possible contexts? 
The former construal fits with King’s own eventual account of propositions, 
according to which they are facts of a sort that feature quantification over linguistic 
expressions.6 But it might be thought rather peremptorily to rule out the possibility of 
propositions of a kind that words—by contrast with, say, pictures and mental sensory 
images—cannot express.7 For the purposes of what follows, I shall therefore focus upon 
some putatively defining features of propositions that remain neutral over the relationships 
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obtaining between propositional contents and specific forms of representational vehicles. 
(The paper’s conclusion will briefly return to the relationships between language and 
propositional content, however.) 
Let’s assume, first, that any proposition P may be evaluated for truth and falsity. (The 
truth or falsity of some representation, as used on a certain occasion to express a proposition, 
may accordingly be treated as deriving from the truth or falsity of the proposition that the 
representation then serves to express.) For, second, we may assume that any proposition P 
serves to define certain truth-conditions; that is, we may assume that, for any given 
proposition, there are some conditions such that, necessarily, the proposition is true just in 
case those conditions obtain.8 
Let’s also assume, third, that any proposition P may feature in more complex 
propositions: one can negate any proposition, for instance, and one can disjoin any 
proposition with any other one. Finally, we may take it that it is possible for any proposition 
P to serve as the object of some propositional attitude, in that the proposition might serve to 
specify the content of some propositional attitude: any proposition can be either believed, or 
doubted, or asserted, or denied, or supposed, and so on.9 
While each of the previous conditions surely features in the “proposition role”, it will 
not be assumed that they are exhaustive; they will thus merely be taken to generate conditions 
whose satisfaction by a bunch of items is necessary for the relevant things to count as 
propositions. If the contents that belong to a certain kind of pictures cannot be evaluated for 
truth and falsity, we may then conclude that pictures of the relevant type do not have 
propositional contents. By contrast, if we find that the contents belonging to the pictures of a 
certain sort meet each of the previous conditions, we as yet have no reason to deny that the 




3. Crane on pictures and propositions 
 
Why might someone claim that pictures have propositional contents? One potential reason for 
doing so—a reason that parallels a potential reason for making an analogous claim about 
perceptual experiences10—relates to the first couple of features of propositions noted in the 
previous section: namely, their evaluability as either true or false and their association with 
truth-conditions. 
 People do not generally talk about whether pictures are simply “true” or “false”. But 
we are often happy enough to evaluate pictures in terms of their “accuracy”. So, for example, 
the following image accurately captures what things were like around a place at a certain 
time: 
 




Relatedly, while it would sound a little odd to talk about the “truth-conditions” that are 
associated with Figure 1, it sounds much more normal to talk of the “accuracy-conditions” 
belonging to the picture. Figure 1’s accuracy-conditions—the conditions under which the 
image supplies an accurate representation of what things are like around a certain place—
feature the presence of a train, for example. 
 One might reasonably wonder about the significance of our reluctance to talk about 
“truth” and “truth-conditions” in relation to pictures, however. Propositional truth is certainly 
one form of accuracy, and it might be suspected that our tendency to favour talk of pictorial 
“accuracy” over talk of pictorial “truth” merely reflects a superficial fact about linguistic 
usage. Would it really be wrong to say that Figure 1, for instance, is “true” relative to a 
certain place at a certain time? Or to say that Figure 1 is associated with certain “truth-
conditions”? But if pictorial “accuracy” can be assimilated to truth, and if pictorial “accuracy-
conditions” can be assimilated to truth-conditions, the idea that pictorial content is 
propositional starts to look more attractive. 
 Crane strongly resists the identification of the accuracy-conditions belonging to 
pictures with propositional truth-conditions, for a variety of reasons.12 While some aspects of 
his arguments seem to be problematic, for reasons explained below, they contain some 
striking observations about communicative uses of pictures. He holds, for example, that “in 
order to obtain something which one can assert [using a picture], or to which one can apply 
logical operations, you need to employ non-pictorial symbols. Without these non-pictorial 
symbols it makes little sense to say that the content of the picture can be something which 
can be asserted, denied, negated or disjoined”13. 
Those points conflate some issues that need ideally to be distinguished. On the one 
hand, there is the claim that one cannot present the contents of pictures with a certain force—
for instance, as true, in the course of an assertion—unless one employs non-pictorial symbols. 
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And, on the other hand, there is the claim that the mere contents of pictures are not suitable to 
feature in certain sorts of logically complex contents, or perhaps it is the claim that one 
cannot produce mere pictures that possess certain sorts of logically complex contents; that 
pictorial contents cannot themselves be negated, for instance, or—alternatively—that one 
cannot produce pictures whose contents amount to negations. 
 Let’s focus on the first of those claims.14 It might be taken to illustrate a more general 
contention, namely that the mere contents of pictures cannot serve as the objects of 
propositional attitudes. It might be held, for example, that one cannot spell out the content of 
a belief or desire, or make an assertion, simply using a picture; rather one must also employ 
some “non-pictorial symbols”.15 But if the mere contents of pictures cannot serve as the 
objects of propositional attitudes, the mere contents of pictures cannot be propositional. 
 While Crane’s remark about assertion seems to be getting at an important point, as 
indeed does the more general thesis just presented, it needs further elaboration. It just is not 
evident, for instance, that one cannot make an assertion using a picture without the explicit 
use of some additional non-pictorial symbols. So, if the surrounding communicative context 
makes it clear that we are concerned with a certain specific visual perspective p, why 
mightn’t I be able to make an assertion concerning what things were like around p simply by 
holding up a picture? One might appeal here to the implicit occurrence of some non-pictorial 
symbols, but this move is in danger of looking ad hoc.  
More generally, it is unclear exactly how Crane’s claims concerning the resources that 
are needed to make assertions using pictures—that is, to perform communicative actions in 
which pictorially-derived contents are presented as true—bear upon the nature of the contents 
possessed by pictures. Someone might use the name “Fred” to refer to the proposition that 
2+2=4, for instance. Yet one cannot make an assertion simply by uttering the name “Fred”, at 
least not in the absence of some suitable scene-setting. But that last point does not 
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demonstrate that the name’s content amounts to any more than the proposition 2+2=4: it just 
bears out the fact that mere names are not the right vehicles for making assertions.   
  Although it is somewhat tempting to think that the contents of pictures stand in 
different relationships to propositional attitudes than do, say, indicative sentences of natural 
languages, and to connect that with the thought that the contents of pictures are not 
propositional, the nature of those relationships needs further investigation. But Crane is 
certainly correct to urge that representational accuracy cannot automatically be equated with 
propositional truth, even though it surely sometimes can be. In particular, note that 
predicative contents, like “_ is red”, may be accurate in relation to specific items. Yet, while 
the accuracy of a predicative content relative to a given item may reflect the truth of an 
associated proposition, the predicative content is not itself propositional; hence talk of a 
representation’s “accuracy” cannot immediately be used to justify the conclusion that the 
representation’s content is propositional. Those last points are in fact highly relevant to the 
current case, as we will see in the next few sections. 
 
4. Pictures and properties 
 
Any discussion of the relationships holding between the contents of pictures and the 
contents of non-pictorial kinds of representations is complicated by the fact that pictures 
themselves form such a ragtag crew. It is hard not to suspect that the contents belonging to 
some pictures are as different in kind as those often belonging to pictures and contrasting 
non-pictorial representations. 
 Thus contrast Figure 1 with, for instance, Picasso’s famous 1911-1912 
painting Ma Jolie. Figure 1’s depiction of a railway is distinctively visual: the image 
depicts what it depicts by showing things as looking certain ways from certain visual 
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perspectives. But Ma Jolie—which depicts a woman, and a guitar, using the 
resources of Analytic Cubism—is different, although it is also a picture. Although 
aspects of the latter’s representation of a woman and a guitar may be read as deriving 
from familiar pictorial strategies for representing women and guitars, the image does 
not perform its overall depictive work by showing things as looking certain ways; it 
has striking similarities to relatively abstract forms of diagrammatic representation, 
for example. 
 The class of pictures seems to be semantically heterogeneous, then. It is therefore 
reasonable to focus on some but not all pictures throughout what follows. More specifically, 
let’s concentrate upon distinctively visual pictures like Figure 1; that is, upon pictures that 
show things as looking certain ways.16 Something like this restriction seems tacitly to be 
invoked by other writers. Crane writes, for example, that “one of the things a painter, for 
example, is doing when painting a (realistic) picture is portraying how things look. The 
point, then, is not that visual perception is essentially pictorial; it is rather that picturing is 
essential visual”17.  
 The overall contents of distinctively visual pictures may be very complex and multi-
layered, often on account of relevant contextual factors. Allegorical paintings do not just 
represent what they represent by showing things as looking certain ways, for instance; they 
also exploit contextually-fixed associations between aspects of the ways that they show 
things as looking and appropriate conceptual materials. More interestingly for our purposes, 
though, uses of distinctively visual pictures within appropriate contexts may enable them to 
function in the transmission of distinctively visual information that is, in certain ways, 
relatively specific. 
 Suppose that Figure 1 were to be produced as evidence in a court case, as showing 
that a train was hurtling down the track near Duncannon at a particular time t. The particular 
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spatiotemporal specificity attaching to the content expressed by that use of the picture would 
be absent from other potential uses of it. Someone could easily instead use Figure 1 to show 
what things supposedly looked like near Macclesfield within 12 hours of a different time t*, 
for instance; or someone could simply use it to show things as looking certain ways “from 
somewhere”, without invoking any associations between the image and some particular 
place. 
 Consider a use of Figure 1 in line with that last suggestion; a use of the picture, that 
is, merely to show things as looking certain ways “from somewhere”, but from nowhere in 
particular. It is natural to think that the content conveyed by that nonspecific use of the 
picture is, in some ways, more fundamental than the more specific contents that might be 
conveyed by alternative uses of the image. 
Someone witnessing our hypothetical court case might initially fail to appreciate that 
the picture is being used to show how things looked from some particular perspectives, for 
instance, while nonetheless appreciating that the image show things as looking certain ways 
“from somewhere”, in the nonspecific sense. But the person might later cotton onto the 
picture’s supposed association with some specific times and places. In doing that, our 
person’s interpretation of the picture would surely build upon her or his earlier 
understanding of Figure 1. For the person would just be hanging the content which he or she 
had previously associated with the picture—by virtue of her or his awareness of the ways 
that the image shows things as looking “from somewhere”—on the hooks now provided by 
some particular viewpoints. 
Construals of distinctively visual pictures that take them to show things as looking 
certain ways from specific perspectives thus seem to build on more primitive contents that are 
associated with the relevant pictures. In particular, the more specific construals seem to build 
upon those contents whose grasp by us accounts for our mere ability to appreciate the ways 
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that the pictures show things as looking from unspecified perspectives. But what is the nature 
of those last, more basic, contents? 
Consider an analogy. Suppose that I am talking to somebody about Nyirimana, a 
person whom we both know, and that I assert that “he is a boy”. My interlocutor full 
understands my statement, and appreciates that it relates to a specific person. But that full 
understanding builds upon a prior appreciation of the mere way that I stated things to be with 
respect to somebody. So, someone who has missed the first part of the conversation—and 
who thus does not make any connection between my use of “he” and my earlier uses of the 
name “Nyirimana”—might appreciate some of what I have said, if the person were simply to 
hear me say that “he is a boy”. For the hearer may appreciate the way that I have said things 
to be with respect “to someone”, even though he or she does not appreciate exactly whose 
properties I have purported to characterise. 
In that case, the hearer’s partial understanding of my assertion amounts to his or her 
appreciation of the property that my assertion invoked for the purposes of characterising 
someone that the hearer was not able to identify. Note, too, that the hearer’s partial 
understanding of the assertion thereby involves an appreciation of certain “accuracy-
conditions” that are associated with the utterance: namely, of those conditions that an item 
must meet if it is to count as being a boy. 
Similarly, here is a suggestion concerning what goes on when we merely appreciate 
that a picture shows things as looking a certain way “from somewhere”, without yet 
associating the picture with any particular visual perspectives: we associate the image with an 
appropriate property of visual perspectives.18 The conditions of satisfaction belonging to the 
properties thus associated with the picture—with the ways that the picture shows things as 
looking—will then amount to the picture’s accuracy-conditions. 
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On this approach, the contents which we associate with pictures, when we merely 
grasp the ways that they show things as looking from unidentified perspectives, are akin to the 
properties that we may associate with linguistic assertions that employ singular terms that we 
do not understand, where the latter properties may be captured using “open sentences” such as 
“_ is a boy”. This thought makes sense, too, of the earlier idea that our associations of more 
specific contents with pictures, as when they are used to make claims concerning what things 
were like relative to particular perspectives, build upon the foundation provided by our mere 
appreciations of the ways that they show things as looking from unspecified perspectives. 
To continue with the linguistic analogy, our ability fully to understand an assertion of 
a sentence like “Jane is tall” calls upon our awareness that the assertion invokes the 
predicative content expressed by the open sentence “_ is tall”: as Frege’s famous metaphor 
has it, our understanding of the assertion results from our ability to fill the “gap” in the 
predicative content expressed by “_ is tall” with a content that denotes whatever is referred to 
by the name “Jane”. Similarly, consider someone’s ability to grasp that, say, Figure 1 is being 
used to show how things supposedly looked from somewhere near Duncannon within 24 
hours of a particular time t. That understanding of the relevant use of Figure 1 depends upon 
the person’s ability appropriately to fill the “gap” in a certain predicative content; namely, in 
the predicative content that one grasps merely by virtue of one’s appreciation of the ways that 
the image shows things as looking from some unspecified visual perspectives.19 
 
5. Distinctively visual contents and pictorial accuracy-conditions 
  
We have seen how distinctively visual pictures—ones that show things as looking certain 
ways—may be used to “show things how things look” in various different ways: they may be 
used to show how things once looked from somewhere, for instance, or how things will look 
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from some particular perspective; or they may be used to show how things look to a subject. 
According to the ideas just developed, though, those uses of distinctively visual pictures are 
nonetheless alike in exploiting predicative contents, contents that express properties of visual 
perspectives. We have seen, too, that distinctively visual pictures may be used to show how 
things look “from somewhere”, but from nowhere in particular, in which case they serve 
simply to express predicative contents of the relevant sort. 
But just what type of properties are at issue here? To follow up some ideas briefly 
called upon in the previous section, one route to an answer to this question is by thinking 
about the “accuracy-conditions” that belong to appropriate pictures; just as one way of getting 
at the property that someone identifies when they merely understand what “he is a boy” says 
“about someone” is by thinking about the “accuracy-conditions” that they thereby associate 
with the partially-understood use of the previous sentence. 
 Reconsider Figure 1. That photo is accurate relative to a viewpoint—to a particular 
orientated spatial location, of the sort relative to which visual appearances are generally 
accurate or inaccurate—just in case the visual perspective’s surroundings are laid out in an 
appropriate manner. But what manner? 
It is tempting here to appeal to appropriate ways that the world might appear to us to 
be through vision, ones that we might seek to characterise in the light of our comprehension 
of the photo itself. While viewing the photo, one might say that the picture shows things as 
looking like this or—while looking at a different bit of it—like that. But note that these ways 
for things to look are not essentially wedded to one’s visual experience of the photo itself. 
They are, for instance, ways that things might also be shown as looking by mental visual 
images. And, more crucially, they are ways that things might look to people in the course of 
genuine visual experiences. 
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Suppose that someone has a visual experience in which things look to him or her 
some way that Figure 1 shows things as looking. Then the person enjoys certain characteristic 
visual appearances. If things look like that to him or her, for instance, the world looks to him 
or her be thus; or, using more words to put things more roughly, it looks to him or her as if a 
certain kind of train stands in certain spatial relationships to appropriate surroundings. 
But Figure 1’s accuracy-conditions are then shaped by the contents of the visual 
appearances that figure in what it is for things to look like that. Consider a visual perspective. 
Figure 1 captures what things look like from that perspective only if things are indeed thus 
relative to the perspective. That is, Figure 1 is accurate relative to the perspective only if, 
relative to the relevant perspective, a suitable kind of train stands in suitable spatial 
relationships to appropriate surroundings.20 
According to the ideas just sketched, the perspective-relative accuracy-conditions that 
belong to a given picture are determined by the ways that the picture shows things as looking: 
the approach regards the picture’s accuracy-conditions as determined by a range of types of 
visual sensations that figure in the picture’s content. For the ways that a picture shows things 
as looking involve certain characteristic visual appearances. The contents of those visual 
appearances then fix the picture’s accuracy-conditions, by determining what things must be 
like around a given perspective for things to be, relative to it, some way that the picture 
shows things to be.21 
Uses of distinctively visual pictures to show things as looking certain ways, in both 
the nonspecific and relatively specific manners described previously, thus do indeed derive 
from the pictures’ association with predicative contents expressing properties of visual 
perspectives. One who merely appreciates the ways that Figure 1 shows things as looking 
“from somewhere”, for instance, thereby associates Figure 1 with the following property of 
visual perspectives: being a visual perspective relative to which things are thus. But that 
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elementary pictorial content may serve as the basis for more complex contents, by being 
combined with components of additional sorts. It may be combined with quantificational 
content-components, for instance, to yield complex contents like the following one: there was 
some visual perspective v by near Duncannon such that, within 24 hours of time t, things 
were thus relative to v. 
It is worth noting, too, that these predicative contents—distinctively visual contents, 
as we may call them—are predicative contents of an especially visual variety. For they are 
features of visual perspectives whose characterisation calls upon the contents of the visual 
appearances that are associated with types of visual sensations. And all this fits very well, of 
course, with our untutored sense that the very information that we get from pictures like 
Figure 1 is strikingly visual. For it implies that our grasp of distinctively visual pictorial 
accuracy-conditions is mediated by our appreciation of ways in which the world may 
apparently be presented to visually responsive subjects through vision.22 
 
6. Pictures and propositions  
 
Where does all this leave the question whether pictorial contents are propositional? 
According to the previous ideas, pictures that show things as looking certain ways possess 
elementary contents of a characteristic sort: namely, the contents that we grasp merely by 
virtue of our appreciations of the ways that the pictures show things as looking “from 
somewhere”, in a nonspecific sense. And those distinctively visual contents are predicative 
rather than propositional. Furthermore, there are certain communicative uses of distinctively 




Thus consider, for instance, the way in which one often and rightly interprets the 
paintings which ones encounter in galleries, pictures that evidently are not meant to portray 
real situations. There, we appreciate the ways that the pictures show things as looking “from 
somewhere”, but from nowhere in particular. And we do not, I think, construe the images as 
expressing some truth-evaluable content to the effect that there are—or even could be—
visual perspectives from which things look the way that the image shows them as looking. 
Rather, our understanding of the paintings—focusing here merely on our appreciation of the 
visual information that they give to us rather than in terms of, say, any of their aesthetic 
features—simply rests with our awareness of the ways that they show things as looking, 
where that just encapsulates our grasp of what it would be for the pictures to be accurate 
relative to some perspectives.  
But distinctively visual pictorial contents are able to feature in more complex contents 
that perform the roles that previously associated with propositions, just as other forms of 
predicative content are able to do. For once the “gaps” in predicative distinctively visual 
contents are filled in suitable ways, we end up with contents that may be evaluated for truth 
and falsity23, that may form the objects of propositional attitudes, that stand in logical 
relationships, and the rest.24 And this explains why pictures may play central roles in 
communicative situations that revolve around propositional information; just consider the 
subtle weighing of pictorially-based evidence that may feature in court cases, for instance, or 
in scientific investigations.25 While distinctively visual pictures may sometimes serve to 
express non-propositional contents, then, they are also commonly used to express 
propositional ones. 
It is worth noting that the suggested assimilation of, first, the accuracy-conditions that 
belong to distinctively visual pictures merely by virtue of the ways that they show things as 
looking with, second, the accuracy-conditions belonging to predicates like “_ is a boy” 
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chimes with one of Crane’s contentions. For it implies that it would be wrong, in general, to 
conflate the accuracy-conditions belonging to pictures with the truth-conditions belonging to 
propositions, even if uses of pictures to express propositional contents are nonetheless 
perfectly unproblematic. And the predicative nature of distinctively visual pictorial contents 
also allows us to explain various striking phenomena relating to potential communicative 
uses of distinctively visual pictures. 
While one can use distinctively visual pictures to make assertions, for instance, a 
certain amount of scene-setting is necessary for this, because one needs to introduce elements 
of content that go beyond the picture’s mere distinctively visual content. Someone who 
sought to use Figure 1 to make an assertion about what things once looked like from a 
particular viewpoint, for instance, would need somehow to get across the identity of the 
relevant perspective to the assertion’s intended audience. The person might rely upon the 
audience’s ability to recognise the location that had been photographed, for instance, or the 
person might spell things out using supplementary words. 
But the same kind of situation arises for other forms of predicative content. If one 
were to try to make an assertion about a particular person by inscribing “_ is a boy”, for 
instance, one would need somehow to introduce into the circumstances additional elements of 
content that go beyond the mere predicative content belonging to the inscribed open sentence: 
one might point at the relevant person, for instance, or exploit one’s audience’s awareness of 
some previous conversation. Analogous points apply to attempted uses of pictures and open 
sentences in performing other speech acts that involve propositional contents, and in relation 
to their use in characterising the contents of our propositional attitudes. 
More generally, then, if we regard the distinctively visual contents of pictures as 
predicative, we may explain the fact that uses of pictures within certain standard 
communicative contexts need to call upon auxiliary forms of communication, or upon shared 
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items of background knowledge, in terms of the general requirements for communicative uses 
of representations possessing predicative contents. 
Although the predicative nature of the most characteristic contents of distinctively 
visual pictures does allow us to explain certain facts about the communicative powers and 
limitations of such images, there is a sense in which the non-propositional nature of 
distinctively visual pictorial content is philosophically somewhat disappointing. For it merely 
reflects the non-propositional nature of predicative contents more generally. In particular, it 
alone does nothing to illuminate some of the main questions that might be raised concerning 
the relationships holding between pictorial and non-pictorial forms of representation.  
  
7. Conclusion: pictorial contents, propositions, and language 
 
It has been argued, first, that there is a core type of pictorial content that is predicative rather 
than propositional but, second, that there are no evident reasons for denying that those core 
contents, when completed in suitable ways, are able to feature in propositions. It has also been 
argued that pictures are commonly used to express their non-propositional predicative 
contents, but that they are also commonly used to express propositional contents that build 
upon those predicative ones. Pictorial contents are thus on all fours, for all that has been said 
so far, with the many predicative—and hence non-propositional—contents that belong to 
familiar linguistic expressions like “_ is red”. 
To conclude, I want briefly to explore the question what the existence of propositions 
that are built upon the distinctively visual contents of pictures might mean for the 
relationships between propositional content and language. Would the existence of 
propositions that are based on the distinctively visual contents of pictures show that some 
propositions cannot be expressed linguistically? 
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Matters are complicated at this point by potential uses of indexical linguistic 
expressions. For it is hard to see why one would not be able to express contents of any given 
variety using linguistic expressions, at least so long as it is possible for language users to 
gesture at representations that possess contents of the relevant sort while using an appropriate 
demonstrative. 
Consider some way that Figure 1 shows things as looking. I can easily assert that there 
could be visual perspectives from which things looked that way. But it is natural to think that 
the content of the assertion that I just made directly incorporates some of the distinctively 
visual content of the picture to which I referred. Let’s concentrate on those propositions that 
are expressible just using non-indexical linguistic expressions, then. 
The accuracy-conditions of distinctively visual contents flow from their 
characterisations of the ways that things look from visual perspectives. So, consider some way 
W that Figure 1 shows things as looking. We have seen that a given visual perspective p is one 
from which things look that way just in case the following holds: the contents of the visual 
appearances involved in what it is for things to look way W to someone hold relative to p. But 
it is not as if indexical-free linguistic representations cannot also characterise things as 
looking certain ways from one or more visual perspectives. 
Thus consider the following indexical-free sentence, which makes reference to some 
visual perspective that someone happens to have just singled out and named using the term 
‘p’: 
 
(1) Things look from p the way that Figure 1 shows them as looking. 
 
Sentence (1) characterises things as looking a certain way from a certain perspective, 
but its propositional content is somewhat different to the—equally propositional, as far as I 
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can tell—content that one might express by holding up Figure 1 itself and asserting, while 
pointing at that image to make it appropriately salient, that things look like this from p. More 
specifically, while the latter assertion would use Figure 1 to show what things supposedly 
looked like from the perspectives in G, the former assertion does not “show” the ways that 
things ostensibly looked from those perspectives. 
How might we understand the difference between those representations, like 
distinctively visual pictures and visual mental images, which show things as looking certain 
ways from one or more perspectives and those representations, like sentence (1), that merely 
characterise things as looking certain ways from one or more perspectives? 
One strategy would be to look to the modes of presentation by means of which the 
contents of representations like distinctively visual pictures and visual mental images identify 
ways for things to look. In particular, part of what is striking about pictures like Figure 1, and 
also about visual mental images, is that our grasp of their contents involves an appreciation of 
what it is like for things to look the ways that the relevant representations show things as 
looking. 
The distinctively visual contents of appropriate pictures and visual mental images are 
thus subjectively informative: they identify ways for things to look in terms of the subjective 
characters that are shared by the possible instances of the relevant ways for things to look. 
And it is perhaps this aspect of the contents of, say, distinctively visual pictures and visual 
mental images that we mark by our inclination to say that the relevant representations “show” 
things as looking certain ways. 
Distinctively visual contents will consequently correspond to indexical-free linguistic 
contents only if indexical-free linguistic contents are capable of being subjectively 
informative in the way that distinctively visual contents are. Now, while I am unable to 
demonstrate indexical-free linguistic contents cannot be subjectively informative in that 
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manner, one might reasonably suspect that they cannot be. For it is hard to see how one might 
construct indexical-free linguistic expressions whose contents are so strongly bound to vision 
that they identify ways for things to look simply in terms of the subjective character that is 
shared by all and only the possible instances of those ways for things to look. 
Thus consider a particular visual experience; let’s call it “e”. It is easy enough to use 
indexical-free language to identify a way for things to look T whose possible instances are just 
those possible visual experiences that share a certain subjective character: just let T 
encompass all and only those possible visual experiences that are subjectively indiscernible 
from e. But, while the way for things to look thereby identified is as subjectively unified as 
one could desire, its previous linguistic characterisation failed to single out the relevant type 
of visual experiences in terms of what it is like for things to look that way. 
Is that shortcoming of the previous linguistic characterisation merely contingent? One 
theme in discussions of non-conceptual perceptual content has been that attempts, using 
indexical-free language, to specify the contents of perceptual states will inevitably fail, 
because the relevant concepts are too coarse-grained to capture aspects of the contents of 
those states that are subjectively available to their subjects. 26 But if nonindexical language 
and conceptual contents more generally are indeed limited in that manner, any propositions 
that are built upon distinctively visual contents will not be expressible using indexical-free 
linguistic means. The notion of a proposition would then not really be essentially linguistic, 
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